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THE PAIUs AGREEMENT, FORCED MIGRATION, AND AMERICA' S
CHANGING REFUGEE POLICY

Alice R. O'Connell

I.

Introduction

In October of 2016, the United Nations ("U.N.") Framework Convention on
Climate Change met the threshold of ratification votes required to enact into
force a set of international rules and regulations colloquially referred to as the
Paris Agreement ("Agreement").' This Agreement sought to strengthen the
global response to climate change by outlining the expectations for research, industry, and policy that each ratifying party to the convention would be expected
to uphold. 2 The Agreement entered into force thirty days after the date of ratification, representing a high-water mark in international cooperation on the subject
of global climate change. 3
According to the U.N. Framework's official website, the United States
("U.S.") signed onto the Paris Agreement on April 22, 2016.4 Their ratification
was approved by the U.N. on September 3, 2016, and the accords formally went
into force for the U.S. on November 4, 2016.5
However, there is a degree of controversy surrounding the U.S.' continued
participation in the Paris Agreement. On June 1, 2017, President Donald Trump
announced that the U.S. would be withdrawing from any participation in the
Paris Agreement. 6 Citing "wildly unfair environmental standards" to be imposed
upon American businesses and workers, the President expressed an interest in
negotiating a better deal for the U.S. with regard to their role in the continuing
climate change discussion.7 As of this article's publication, however, no such
deal has been established.
The U.S. sits at something of a crossroads with the international community
on the matter of climate change and the nation's role in stemming its tide. This
lack of legal and political clarity could well spell disaster for a demographic of
individuals who stand to lose the most from the implications of global climate
change. This article will seek to establish a legal definition of climate migrancy
as it pertains to domestic and international standards.
U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev/1 (Dec. 12, 2015).
2

Id.

3 Id.
4 PARIS AGREEMENT - STATUS OF RATIFICATION,

http://unfccc.int/paris-agreement/items/9444.phpc
5

U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change,

(last visited Nov. 27, 2018).

Id.

6 Michael D. Shear, Trump Will Withdraw U.S. From Paris Climate Agreement, N.Y. TIMES (June

1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/climate/trump-paris-climate-agreement.html?_r-0.
7 Id.
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H.

History and Background

A.

The United Nations Refugee Convention of 1951

Early attempts to define the boundaries of what legally constituted a refugee
were spearheaded by the U.N. at the Refugee Convention of 1951 ("Refugee
Convention").8 The U.N. Refugee Agency today describes the core principle of
the Refugee Convention as the "key legal document that forms the basis of [their]
work." 9 The U.N. further emphasizes the core principle of non-refoulment that
comprises the central message of the convention; it states that a refugee should
not be returned to a country "where they face serious threats to their life or
freedom." 10
The Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees ("UNHCR") notes in
its introduction to the currently available transcript of the resolution that the Refugee Convention was originally intended to deal with the fallout from World War
II.11 The resolution was originally limited in scope to events that took place prior
to its passage and specifically within European nations. It was later expanded by
a 1967 protocol that amended the original resolution, removing the previously
established limitations and granting universal international coverage to the Refugee Convention. 1 2 Since then, participating regions have adopted and amended
the 1967 standard to suit their individual international needs and interests. All the
same, the standards established within the original document and its subsidiaries
retain a significant influence upon modern understandings of refugee legal status
and discourse.
Critically, Article I of the 1951 Refugee Convention endorses a single definition of the term "refugee."' 3 The original text couched the language in the retrospective, defining a refugee as any person who "as a result of events occurring
before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
14
political opinion" was unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin.
Once the temporal restrictions within this definition were lifted, the newly-broadened standard served as the watermark for international policymaking bodies for
decades to come. Indeed, it remains today the functionally employed definition
of the U.S.' own refugee code, as well as the definition utilized by many other
15
member nations who subscribe to the U,N,'s principles on refugee standards.
8 The 1951 Refugee Convention, UNHCR,
tion.html (last visited Nov. 28, 2018).

https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/1951-refugee-conven-

9 Id.
10 Id.
11 UNHRC,

CONVENTION

AND

www.unhcr.org/en-us/3b66c2aal0
12 Id. at 2.

PROTOCOL

RELATING

TO

THE

STATUS

OF

REFUGEES,

https://

[hereinafter UN Refugee Protocol].

13 Id. at 3.
14 Id. at 14.
15 REFUGEE AcT OF 1980, PuB. L. No. 96-212, 94 STAT. 102
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Refugee Act of 1980].
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The convention and its subsequent renditions do place limits upon that
straightforward definition. For example, the definition exempts individuals who
may have committed war crimes, individuals who benefit "from the protection or
assistance of a United Nations agency other than the UNHCR," and refugees who
have "status equivalent to nationals in their country of asylum." 16 Still, these
exceptions are still firmly couched in the original persecution based standard. At
the time of its writing, the 1951 Refugee Convention served as a seminal advancement in the rights and interests of displaced persons. However, while that
standard remains a flagship legal principle in the modem world of international
law, its language has begun to show its age in significant and problematic ways.
B.

The Refugee Act of 1980

Today, American legal understanding of refugees and their legal standing is
derived in large part from the Refugee Act of 1980. The passage of this act
marked the first time that federal law instituted a system for the processing and
admission of refugees based upon the U.N. definition of persecution.' 7 Prior to
the institution of this Act, the U.S. tended to admit only refugees from countries
in the Middle East, or Communist states.' 8 This change allowed them to adapt
elements of the U.N. 1951 Refugee Convention relating to the status of refugees.
The Refugee Act of 1980 broadened the then-poorly-established standards and
opened the door for a more generalized understanding of the sorts of individuals
who qualified for refugee status in America and the ways in which they were
processed and admitted to the country.19
However, the standards of classification established in the Refugee Act of
1980 and later elaborated upon in subsequent legislation remains narrow. Specifically, the Immigration and Nationality Act classifies a refugee as "a person who
is unwilling or unable to return to his or her home country because of a 'wellfounded fear of persecution' due to race, membership in a particular social group,
political opinion, religion, or national origin'." 2 0 This definition couches its language deeply in the original 1951 Refugee Convention, which continues to serve
as the modern standard.
Critically, this standard remains narrower than a mere examination of whether
a person is "unwilling or unable" to return to his or her home country. The Immigration and Nationality Act specifically requires that an individual be seeking
asylum due to persecution. This standard excludes individuals who might find
themselves unwilling or unable to return to their home country for any myriad of
reasons beyond persecution. Specifically, it fails to account for the possibility
that an individual may be seeking refuge due to displacement caused by a natural
disaster or other climate-related incident.

17

UN Refugee Protocol, supra note 11.
Refugee Act of 1980, supra note 12.

18

Id.

16

19 Id.
20

8 U.S.C.A.

§

1101 (West 2014).
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Andrew E. Shacknove of the University of Chicago observed that the definitions of refugee status adopted by the U.N. and by extension the U.S. are predicated on an implicit four-part argument: first, that a bond of trust existed between
the citizen and the state from which they are seeking refuge; second, said bond
was severed or disconnected; third, persecution and alienage are "always the
physical manifestations of this severed bond;" and finally, that those manifesta2
tions are "necessary and sufficient conditions for determining refugeehood." 1 In
other words, Mr. Shacknove suggests that current conceptions of refugeehood
necessarily require that an individual's relationship with their state of origin be
harmed in a specific and observable way.
Standardization certainly makes for more straightforward legal classification;
in the eyes of American courts, clear and specific standards are far more straightforward to apply across a variety of legal situations. However, said ease of use
comes at the cost of equity. By presupposing an injured relationship between the
alien and their state of origin as a necessary requirement for refugee status, the
current refugee standard unnecessarily restricts access to the rights and interests
of refugee status to other individuals who may be fleeing their homes for reasons
that extend beyond persecution. Any number of scenarios may prompt an individual to flee their country of origin in search of safer horizons; limiting the
applicability of the refugee standard with such a prerequisite comes with too high
an equity cost to warrant retention.
In a recent publication, Mr. Shacknove identifies the most immediate and apparent example of a class of individuals who fall through the cracks of the current
standard. 2 2 He insists that persecution is "just one manifestation" of the absence
of physical security, and emphasizes for example that natural disasters are often
dismissed as points of genesis for refugee status precisely because they are not
political in nature. 23 Floods and hurricanes do not threaten to erode or break the
connection between citizen and state in the traditional sense nor do these natural
disasters inspire displacement by way of a well-founded fear of persecution.
They do, however, certainly instill a well-founded fear all their own. It is undeniable that an individual may be prompted (or indeed, may be required) to flee
their country of origin due to the effects of a natural disaster. Why, then, does the
current refugee standard fail to acknowledge such an individual as such under the
current standards established in the U.S. and abroad? As Mr. Shacknove astutely
illustrates, the legitimacy of any refugee policy is undeniably compromised
where refugee status is refused to worthy claimants. The currently employed definition of what constitutes a refugee fails to meet this baseline test, and as such is
insufficient.

21 Andrew E. Shacknove, Who is a Refugee?, 95 E-rmcs 274, 274-284 (1985).
22 Id. at 279.
23 Id.
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The "Well-Founded Fear" Standard and US Immigration Law

C.

The U.S. refugee standard has been well examined in domestic courts. In
I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca,the appellant sought an overturn of the decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals, arguing that she was eligible for consideration for
asylum. 2 4 The Supreme Court held that in order to show a "well-founded fear of
persecution," an alien seeking asylum need not prove that it was "more likely
than not" that they would have been persecuted in their home country. 25 In the
opinion of the Court, Justice Stevens explained that the 1980 Immigration and
Nationality Act provided two separate methods through which an "otherwise deportable alien who claims that he will be persecuted if deported can seek relief." 2 6 Specifically, Justice Stevens mentioned Section 243(h) of the act, which
requires the Attorney General to withhold deportation of an alien who demonstrates that his "life or freedom would be threatened on account of one of the
listed factors if he is deported." 2 7 The Court urged that this standard and the
"well-founded fear" standard are separate entities that are mutually exclusive of
each other; the rules that govern one do not necessarily govern the other in
tandem.28
In other words, the rules governing deportation of aliens do not necessarily
affect the initial classification of individuals under the well-founded fear standard. Though there may be exceptions and legal loopholes that allow an individual to escape deportation despite their lack of legal refugee status, the fact
remains that the refugee standard is overly narrow in and of itself due to its
overemphasis on the historical wording and context from which the current standard is derived.
There is a clear difference between the way the U.S. Government treats formally ascribed refugees - those fleeing a well-founded fear of persecution - or
non-refugee aliens that fail to meet the U.N.-inspired standard. This discrepancy
stands at odds with what is increasingly being seen as the clear and present threat
of climate change. An increasingly convincing body of evidence points to climate
change as having an inevitable and dramatic effect on ecological and social systems the world over. 29 Scientists and researchers alike fear that the "unprecedented" challenges presented by the advent of climate change based threats may
outstrip the current constraints of the international community's legal framework. 30 Climate change may well cause problems that the current international
legal system is not equipped to solve.
"The vulnerability. . . of people to climate change depends on the extent to
which they are dependent on natural resources and ecosystem services," writes
24

IN.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca.480 U.S. 421 (1987).

25 Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 423.
26

Id.

Id.
Id. at 423-24.
29 Jon Barnett, Security and Climate Change, 13.1
30 Id. at 8.
27
28
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'

Jon Barnett in his examination of political security and climate change, "the extent to which the resources and services they rely on are sensitive to climate
3
change, and their capacity to adapt to changes in these resources and services."
Barnett and contemporaries that share his viewpoint express concerns over the
international community's collective ability to respond to the unique challenges
presented by a changing climate landscape. His particular focus is in matters of
security - how do states ensure that their own residents remain safe in the face of
climate-fueled events?
However, the concerns of Mr. Barnett can be extended beyond the boundaries
of dangers to domestic security. The standards established in the 1951 U.N. Refugee Convention that were later adopted by countless prominent members of the
international community clearly emphasize the need to address concerns related
to persecution-fueled migration. However, the increased likelihood of climaterelated disasters across the globe is accompanied by a tangentially increasing
likelihood that individuals may be displaced by such disasters. As currently construed, the international refugee standard is not equipped to handle this requisite
increase.
32
As of 2014, there were approximately fourteen million refugees in the U.S.
Top countries of origin included Afghanistan, Syria, Somalia, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Myanmar. 3 3 All of these refugees were subject
to some sort of well-founded fear of persecution, as the U.N.-adopted standard
dictates. Notably, the most frequent countries of origin for American refugees
share certain characteristic defects with regard to domestic violence, strife, and
persecution. This makes a great deal of sense; politically and socially unstable
nations would naturally produce the conditions necessary for the fraying of the
connection between citizen and state that Andrew Shacknove identified as the
prerequisite requirement for a finding of persecution.
The U.S. Refugee Admissions Program ("USRAP") is required each year to
review the refugee situation or emergency refugee situation to project the extent
of possible participation of the U.S. in resettling refugees, and to discuss the
reasons for believing that the proposed admission of refugees is justified by humanitarian concerns, grave humanitarian concerns or is otherwise in the national
interest. 34 "Annually," the USRAP public web page explains, "processing priorities are established to determine which of the world's refugees are of special
humanitarian concern to the United States. Fulfilling a processing priority enables a refugee applicant the opportunity to interview. . . but does not guarantee
acceptance." 35 As of the conclusion of 2017, the priorities currently in use included the following: "cases that are identified and referred to the program by the
31 Id. at 8-9.
32 AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, AN OVERVIEW OF U.S. REFUGEE LAW AND Poucy (2015).

33 Id.
34 The United States Refugee Admissions Program, U.S. CITIznNSInP & IMMIGR. SERV., https://
www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/refugees/united-states-refugee-admissions-program-usrapconsultation-worldwide-processing-priorities (last updated May 05, 2016).

35 Id.
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UNCHR, a United States Embassy, or a designated non-governmental organization;" "groups of special humanitarian concern identified by the U.S. refugee
program"; and "family reunification cases". 36 The site further emphasizes that
refugees must "generally be outside their country of origin."
Taken in a vacuum, these standards would seem to suggest some modicum of
legal ground for the climate refugee to stand upon. However, the fact remains
that the priorities are largely still routed through the U.N. proper or through the
well-founded fear standard that the U.S. adopted from the U.N.'s own rules. Indeed, USRAP's own "refugee eligibility determination" page explains that during
the admissions interview "all relevant evidence" is examined to determine if the
applicant, amongst other things, meets the definition of refugee.3 7 Here, still, the
U.N. standard reigns; and so long as it continues to do so aliens seeking refuge
from climate-related disasters will continue to encounter marked legal resistance
to their attempts to relocate.
This is not to say that the U.S. and other interested parties are unaware of the
threats that climate change presents. On June 1, 2017, an article was published in
the Louisville Courier-Journal regarding the potential advent of domestic climate
refugees. "The United States can expect massive population shifts as the weight
of climate change bears down and sea levels rise perhaps six feet by the end of
the century," wrote reporter James Bruggers. 38
"As many as 13 million Americans living in coastal areas could be flooded out
by 2100," Bruggers emphasizes, citing research completed by University of
Georgia demographer Mathew E. Hauer.39 Hauer's model suggested that coastal
Americans may seek refuge in inland states such as Indiana, Kentucky, Ohio and
Tennessee. Specifically, Bruggers reports that heavily populated areas such as
Miami, New Orleans and New York could be solely responsible for over three
million domestic climate refugees. 40
Indeed, the U.S. has already begun to resettle domestic climate migrants.41 In
2016, the Federal Government allocated a $48 million federal grant to focus on
the resettlement of the former residents of Isle de Jean Charles in southeastern
Louisiana.4 2 This grant arrived in virtual tandem with another $1 billion dollar,
thirteen-state series of grants designed to help communities adapt to climate
change threats. While the majority of that money was spent on shoring up currently existing communities, at least a portion of it (the portion designated for
36 Id.

37 Refugee Eligibility Determination, U.S. CITIZENSHIP &1 IMMIGR. SERv., https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/refugees/refugee-eligibility-determination (last updated Apr. 8, 2013).
38 James Bruggers, Rising Sea Levels Could Create American Climate Refugees, USA TODAY (June
1, 2017, 2:48 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2017/06/01/rising-sea-levels-climate-refugees/362544001/.
39 Id.

4 Id.
41 Coral Davenport & Campbell Robertson, Resettling the FirstAmerican 'Climate Refugees', N.Y.
TIMES (May 2, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/03/us/resettling-the-first-american-climaterefugees.html.
42 Id.
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Isle de Jean Charles) was allocated with the specific intention of relocating an
3
entire community struggling with the impacts of climate change. 4
The Times article cites a study conducted by the U.N. University Institute for
the Environment and Human Security, alongside the International Organization
for Migration, which states that "between 50 million and 200 million people
mainly subsistence farmers and fishermen - could be displaced by 2050 because
of climate change."44 "The changes are underway and they are very rapid," said
Interior Secretary Sally Jewell at the time of the article's publication. "We will
have climate refugees." 45
Walter Kaelin, the head of the U.N. research organization the Nansen Initiative, emphasized this reality by suggesting that it would not be enough to simply
respond once the disasters inevitably arrived. "You don't want to wait until people have lost their homes," he said in an interview, "until they flee and become
refugees. The idea is to plan ahead and provide people with some measure of
choice." 4

6

The U.S. is also considering the extension of domestic protections to U.S.
nationals. 4 7 This further cements the reality of the situation: the U.S. Government
is, to some degree, well aware of the likely increase in climate migrancy that is
due to occur in the coming years. Still, U.S. nationals are afforded similar, if
lesser, rights and protections as U.S. citizens. They, too, are exempt from any
sort of refugee processing that might otherwise disqualify them from seeking
refuge in the U.S. proper for failing to meet the U.N. standard. Domestic refugees
are not constrained by international rules or regulations. They need not face any
well-founded fear (of persecution or otherwise) to justify their decision to move
across the country. Still, this article and others like it demonstrate a clear and
undeniable acknowledgement of the imminent risk posed by the continuing effects of climate change. Further, it demonstrates specifically that researchers are
concerned about the impacts that climate change may have on the residents of
coastal towns, cities and states. The citizens of Miami and New York may take
solace in the fact that there are inland options that they can relocate to without
fear of being barred by archaic refugee standards. Residents of island or coastal
nations that lack the requisite inland landmass of the U.S. and its contemporaries
face a greater threat, with fewer protections available to them.
The Paris Agreement and Forced Migration

D.

According to the UNCHR, an annual average of twenty-one and one half million people have been forcibly displaced by "weather-related sudden onset
43 Id.
44 Davenport & Robertson, supra note 41.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Daniel Cusick & Adam Aton, Puerto Ricans Could be Newest U.S. Climate Refugees, Sci. AM.
(Sep. 28, 2017) https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/puerto-ricans-could-be-newest-u-s-climaterefugees/.
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hazards. . . each year since 2008."#4 Climate change (and the resulting climate
migrancy) is an emerging threat - and the UNCHR's statements on the subject
have made their developing interest in the subject clear. 4 9
The U.N. and its member states have presented remarkable initiative with regard to the implementation and ratification of the Paris Agreement.5 0 The UN's
last major climate initiative, commonly referred to as the Kyoto Protocol, took
eight years to enter into force.5 1 The Paris Agreement, by contrast, entered into
force a scant year after its legal conception. 52 Legal authorities have described
the Paris Agreement as a "diplomatic accomplishment of the highest order".5 3
New changes in the way that international policymakers attempted to address the
concerns presented by continuing climate phenomena dominate discussion, and
the world looks to the United Nations to serve as something of an arbiter for the
expected policies that major world powers will be expected to enact and enforce
in their own territories. 54
What motivated the rapidity behind the ratification of this cornerstone piece of
international law? Reasonable minds differ as to precisely why the accords have
proven so amicable where other similar attempts have failed to capture the interest of so many involved parties.5 5 Some experts point to the moderate aims of the
agreement's various proposals, describing the solutions suggested as a collective
"Goldilocks solution" that sits somewhere in the happy medium between overly
stringent and undereffective. 5 6
Still, some key differences exist between the Paris Agreement and prior attempts to address climate change. Unlike previous political attempts such as the
Copenhagen Accord, the Paris Agreement is a fundamentally legally binding instrument.5 7 While the Paris Agreement is sparse in terms of actually addressing
climate migration itself, it nevertheless represented a step forward for US foreign
policy with regard to acknowledging the dangers of climate change and their
impact on at-risk communities that are more likely to produce climate migrants.5 8
48 Frequently asked questions on climate change and disaster displacement, UNHRC (Nov. 6, 2016),

https://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2016/11/581 f52dc4/frequently-asked-questions-climate-change-disaster-displacement.html.
49 Id.
50 Calvin Nguyen, The Paris Agreement After 2016, GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. ONLINE 1 (2016).
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 See Bonnie Smith, Adapting the Paris Agreement (Apr. 18, 2016), ENVTL. L. REV. SYNDICATE,

https://www.nyuelj.org/2016/04/adapting-the-pais-agreement/.
55 See Daniel Bodansky, The Paris Climate Change Agreement: A New Hope?, 110 AM. J. INT'L L.
288, 289 (2016).
56 Id.

58 See Kristen Lambert, The Paris Agreement: Spotlight on Climate Migrants, YALE: FORESTRY

&

57 Id. at 290.

ENVTL. BLOG (Dec. 29, 2015), https://environment.yale.edulblog/2015/12/the-paris-agreement-spotlighton-climate-migrants/.
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The Paris Agreement was initially ratified in late 2015, with the assent of 195
member nations.5 9 It was described as a "historic breakthrough" for acquiring the
assent of member nations normally renowned for their disinterest in Climate Initiatives, such as China and India. 60 The ratification of the accords represented a
nine-year ordeal that was met with universal acclaim in the international community. It also represented a watershed moment in the United States' specific interaction with the topic of climate change and climate migration - a subject that had
not truly been breached since the 1980 Refugee Act, if at all. All the same, a
number of barriers remained between US foreign policy and true legal and political readiness for the emergence of the climate migration issue - and the state
soon proved that it was intent to take a step back before moving further forward.
III.

Discussion

Previous attempts to establish forward-thinking climate change based refugee
61
policy have often failed to address the issue of climate migration. The Paris
Agreement, specifically, considered but did not address the topic of forced migration. 6 2 As such, proposals for how, exactly, states might address the rising
threat of climate migration have varied widely.
Even settling on a proper definition for the term 'climate migrant' has proven
difficult for the international academic and legal communities. 63 A generally accepted baseline definition refers to individuals whose "movement is triggered" in
substantial part "by the effects of climate change".6" This definition is overly
broad; it allows for the inclusion of both individuals who are displaced by single,
catastrophic events such as great storms or floods or famines, as well as for the
inclusion of individuals who are forced to move by the more gradual, continual
effects of climate change such as the rising of sea levels to the detriment of
coastal settlements.6 5
This definition would likely be sufficient to overcome the limitations of the
currently utilized language of the UN charter as well as the US Refugee Act of
1980. By expanding the definition of what constitutes a refugee to include individuals fleeing the effects of climate change as well as those fleeing the effects of
persecution, the law would be suitably broadened so as to not disadvantage potential asylum seekers on account of a linguistic technicality that did not consider
the possible effects of climate change science that, at the time of the law's passage, was either poorly formed or not established at all.
59 Coral Davenport, Nations Approve Landmark Climate Accord in Paris, N.Y. TIMEs (Dec. 12,
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/13/world/europe/climate-change-accord-paris.html.
60 Id.

61 See Phillip Dane Warren, Note, Forced Migration After Paris COP21: Evaluating the Climate
Change Displacement Coordination Facility, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 2103 (2016).
62 Id. at 2106.
63 See Claire DeWitte, At Water's Edge: Legal Protections and Funding for a New Generation of
Climate Change Refugees, 16 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 211, 221-22 (2010).

6

Lambert, supra note 58, at 2110.

65 Id.
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Pundits agree that multilateral global action is required to mitigate the harm
done to the climate migrants of the future. 66 "The efforts of individual states are
not enough to stem the negative impact of climate change," wrote University of
Denver legal scholar Jeremy M. Bellavia in the summer of 2016.67 That being
said, it is easy to see how the unilateral actions of major international powers
such as the United States might serve to influence the decision-making bodies
like the United Nations that hope to satisfy the requirement for multilateral action
that scholars agree will be necessary.
Unfortunately, the United States of 2017 seems disinclined to acquiesce to the
interests of the global community when it comes to issues of climate science
including issues of climate migration.6 8 While recent reports suggest that President Trump might be more inclined to 'rejoin' the Paris Agreement, the United
States government has made no formal indication that it intends to abide by the
standards set forth by the Paris Agreement or any similar climate change document. 6 9 President Trump has in previous instances expressed a passing interest in
'renegotiating' the terms of the Paris Agreement to more appropriately suit
America's supposed interests. 70 However, leaders of other relevant world powers, such as France's Emmanuel Macron, have stated that they would not be
willing to renegotiate the terms of the deal (which has already been ratified and
put into effect).7 1
Indeed, current US foreign and domestic policy interests seem to be geared
against the relaxing or broadening of any standard of acceptance for refugees or
other international parties interested in relocating to the United States. 7 2 The
White House has remained steadfast in its focus upon border security policies,
including the divisive wall promised during the current president's 2016 presidential campaign.7 3 In fact, the white house is using the wall's construction as a
requirement for the signing of any legislative solution that attempts to provide
legal status for 800,000 immigrants currently living in the United States who
were brought illegally to the country as Children (a demographic colloquially
known as Dreamers, after the Obama initiative that first attempted to grant them
protections).7 4
If anything, it seems more likely that the current administration would attempt
to further curtail the types of individuals who qualified for refugee status, instead
66 See Jeremy M. Bellavia, Article, What Does Climate Justice Look Like for the Environmentally
Displaced in a Post ParisAgreement Environment? Political Questions and Court Deference to Climate

Science in the Urgenda Decision, 44 DENv. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 453 (2016).
67 Id.

68 Shear, supra note 6.
69 Climate Change: Trump Says US 'Could Conceivably' Rejoin Paris Deal, BBC NEWS (Jan. 11,
2018), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-42642331.
70 Id.
71 Id.

72 See Michael D. Shear, White House Makes Hard-Line Demands for Any 'Dreamers'Deal, N.Y.
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of expanding the definition as this article proposes. It would not be the first time
that the Trump administration attempted to limit refugee intake; one of the President's first major acts manifested in the form of an executive order that suspended the entire refugee resettlement program for a period of three months and
further indefinitely banned the resettlement of refugees from Syria and other nations.7 5 This executive order was issued despite the already stringent require76
The
ments imposed upon individuals seeking refuge in the United States.
resettlement process lasted up to 36 months in length, and involved screenings
77
from various organizations in the interest of maintaining domestic security.
The President's 'travel ban', as it has become colloquially known throughout
the various news media that have covered its announcement and attempted im78
plementation, has sustained a contentious and divisive life cycle. Additionally,
79
The travel ban itself has a fixed
the legality of the ban remains in question.
duration and it would not be likely to impact future climate migrant populations.
However, it remains representative of a sea change in White House foreign policy with regard to the handling of refugees by the United States. When combined
with a congressional atmosphere that some pundits are describing as divisive, it
is difficult to imagine a Trump-led U.S. Government that concerns itself with the
rising threat of climate migration.s 0
IV.

Analysis

The United States Federal Government is currently poorly equipped to address
a potential increase in global climate migration. First, it is not legally capable of
differentiating between climate migrants and traditional refugees fleeing from
prejudice or persecution. Second, nationalist and anti-immigration sentiment
prevails in the executive and legislative branches, limiting the effectiveness of
government intervention. Finally, existing disaster response protocols fail to appropriately address the main concerns likely to be amplified by climate change.
As previously stated, the current American legal understanding of what it
means to be a refugee fails to take into account the possibility that individuals
might be fleeing their country of origin for reasons other than persecution.,, Critically, the original UN charter did not recognize the environment as an agent
75 David Miliband. Donald Trump's Un-American Refugee Policy, N.Y. Times (Jan. 27, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/27/opinion/donald-trumps-un-american-refugee-policy.html.
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capable of persecution. 82 This, despite the fact that the UN itself has explored the
links between human mobility and climate change. 8 3 In 2014 alone, 19 million
people from over 100 countries were forced to flee their homes for reasons linked
to climate change. 84
A change in the definition of refugees would likely require a baseline acknowledgement of the phenomena driving the possibility of climate migration in
the first place. However, the current federal government remains belligerent in its
opposition to the notion of climate science.85 Immediately upon the assumption
of power by the current administration, the United States Environmental Protection Agency removed any reference to climate change or global warming from its
public website. 86 In Mexico alone, 700,000 citizens must relocate due to natural
resource depletion. 7 Despite this, climate migrants continue to lack pathways of
migration to safe havens or legal protections once they arrive there.88 Until the
definitional understanding of what it means to be a refugee changes, that is likely
to remain the case.
Further, the federal government is plagued by a lack of support for and understanding of the specific topic of climate migration. 89 In keeping with the definition provided by the Refugee Act of 1980, the State Department only serves to
recognize the circumstances of refugees fleeing persecution. 90 The State Department claims that the United States is responsible for two thirds of all refugees
that settle in neither their country of origin or their country of initial flight.9 1
However, the department emphasizes that the percentage of refugees who are
permitted to do this are very small, and represent only those who face the highest
risk. 92 The state department emphasizes that total resettlement is a solution for
'only a few' who are so in danger of persecution that returning to their home
country is literally or logistically impossible. 9 3
The United States (and other countries and entities including the UN) do have
systems and safeguards currently in place intended to mitigate the potential increase of climate migrants. 94 Systems of national preparedness have been put into
place with the intent of equipping the nation to confront all manner of potential
82 5 Facts on Climate Migrants, INSTITUTE FOR ENV'T. AND HUMAN SEC (Nov. 26, 2015), https://

ehs.unu.edu/blog/5-facts/5-facts-on-climate-migrants.htm.
83 Lambert, supra note 58.
84 Id.

85 The United States Environmental Protection Agency (hereinafter EPA). "This page is being renovated." EPA. January 20, 2017.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, STATE DEP'T, https://www.state.gov/j/prm/.
9

Refugee Admissions, STATE DEuP'T, https://www.state.gov/j/prm/ra/index.htm.

91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 PresidentialPolicy Directive 8: National Preparedness, DEP'T. OF HOMELAND SEC. (Mar. 30,

2011), https://www.dhs.gov/presidential-policy-directive-8-national-preparedness.

Volume 16, Issue 2

Loyola University Chicago International Law Review

277

The Paris Agreement

catastrophes, man-made and natural. 95 Theoretically, these frameworks as designated are meant to be "built upon scalable, flexible, and adaptable coordinating
structures" in order to allow room for improvement and adaptability to the ever96
changing threats that might face the United States and its citizens.
However, intervening bodies such as the UN and the US are met with controversy for their focus on the areas of on-site disaster relief instead of disaster
prevention. 9 7 Research has showed that globally only one percent of all develop98
ment aid goes towards what is known as 'disaster risk reduction' or DRR.
Traditional means of responding to disasters - such as on-site relief efforts and
reconstruction interests - are beginning to be supplemented by more innovative
explorations of prevention, but progress is slow. 99 An unwillingness to bend from
traditional responses to natural disasters might limit future ability to adapt to the
newly increased demands of climate change and migration.
Ideally, major international relief actors such as the United States would mitigate the risks of an increase in climate migration by adapting their current policies to suit the imminent changes. Truth be told, the US never formally
committed to the Paris Accords in the first place - at least not in the way that the
constitution might require. 10o Article II, section 2 of the United States constitution requires that the President receive the advice and consent of the Senate
before making treaties. 10 1 However, then-President Barack Obama adopted the
02
Paris Agreement without engaging with this constitutionally required process.1
This accelerated adoption of the Paris Agreement allowed President Trump to
likewise unilaterally withdraw the agreement's acceptance.
That being said, clear incongruities exist between the United States' current
domestic and foreign policy trends and the likely increase in climate change related political and legal concerns including climate migration. The current legal
framework for refugee processing and aid simply has no answer for a world
where climate migration presents a serious and prescient issue on an international
stage. The United States is a major political entity that directly influences the
trends in international law and policy with its legal and political decision making.
As such, if the United States continues to fail to acknowledge and adapt the risks
posed by climate change, remaining incongruities in the framework of international refugee law will create a host of problems for a world where climate migration has become a real and pressing reality.
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